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What is the relationship between internal development and integration into the global economy in developing countries? How and why do state-market relations differ? And do these differences matter in the post-cold war era of global conflict and cooperation? Drawing on research in China, India, and Russia and examining sectors from textiles to telecommunications, Micro-institutional Foundations of Capitalism introduces a new theory of sectoral pathways to globalization and development. Adopting a historical approach, the book's Strategic Value Framework shows how state elites perceive the strategic value of sectors in response to internal and external pressures. Sectoral structures and organization of institutions further determine the role of the state in market coordination and property rights arrangements. The resultant dominant patterns of market governance vary by country and sector within country. These national configurations of sectoral models are the micro-institutional foundations of capitalism, which mediate globalization and development.

In China's Regulatory State, Roselyn Hsueh demonstrates that China only appears to be a more liberal state; even as it introduces competition and devolves economic decisionmaking, the state has selectively imposed new regulations at the sectoral level, asserting and even tightening control over industry and market development, to achieve state goals. By investigating in depth how China implemented its economic policies between 1978 and 2010, Hsueh gives the most complete picture yet of China's regulatory state, particularly as it has shaped the telecommunications and textiles industries. Hsueh contends that a logic of strategic value explains how the state, with its different levels of authority and maze of bureaucracies, interacts with new economic stakeholders to enhance its control in certain economic sectors while relinquishing control in others. Sectoral characteristics determine policy specifics although the organization of institutions and boom-bust cycles influence how the state reformulates old rules and creates new ones to maximize benefits and minimize costs after an initial phase of liberalization. This pathbreaking analysis of state goals, government-business relations, and methods of governance across industries in China also considers Japan's, South Korea's, and Taiwan's manifestly different approaches to globalization

The role that China is perceived to present for the global economy—much less global security—has changed remarkably since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001. During the height of neoliberalism and third-wave democracies, China appeared more open to foreign capital than the developmental states of East Asia, which had restricted foreign direct investment (FDI) in favor of domestic industrialization during a comparable stage of economic development. Through the first 15 years of China's WTO membership, many in academia and the policy world depicted a modernizing China undergoing market transition, in parallel to Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The 2018 publication of Ariel Ahram, Patrick Köllner, and Rudra Sil's edited volume Comparative Areas Studies: Methodological Rationales & Cross-Regional Applications (CAS) inspires enthusiasm from scholars of political science, such as myself, who are already engaged (with some trepidation in the age of mixed-methods and experimental research) in the enterprise of cross-regional contextualized comparisons. Reflecting on my own work, as well as other scholarship in the study of the political economy of development (PED), particularly comparative studies that engage the politics of China as a case, this essay considers how CAS encourages at least three synergies.

AbstractScholars debate whether states or markets drive economic policy in the context of internationalization. Unpacking the market–state dichotomy, liberal pluralists and institutionalists alike conduct sectoral analysis to examine economic policies and outcomes. They debate the relative importance of sectors versus factors and the impact of sectoral coalitions, structural characteristics, and institutional trajectories. Building on previous scholarship, this article argues that state imperatives, such as national security and technological advancement, are an important guide to understanding dominant patterns of economic policy, defined as state goals, government–business relations, and state methods. Beyond that, the organization of institutions and structural sectoral attributes influence the ways in which actual policy outcomes vary across sectors and time. Case studies of the liberalization and subsequent reregulation of foreign direct investment across subsectors of telecommunications in China substantiate this argument. Evidence from other industries further validates this explanatory model.

Scholarship on the institutional foundations of Chinese‐style capitalism emphasizes the impact of liberal reformers and China's participation in international organizations, devolution of economic decision making and local experimentation, and the proliferation of market actors to explain their origins. This article investigates distinct patterns of sectoral variation in market governance in China today, examining the extent and scope in which dominant forms of market coordination and distribution of property rights reflect variation in national goals of economic power, security, and growth; structural sectoral attributes; and the path‐dependent effects of institutional arrangements. The reinforcement of state coordination and the dominance of state ownership and shareholding in strategic industries, such as telecommunications, and the relinquishment of state control and the dominance of market stakeholders in nonstrategic sectors, such as textiles, characterize the rise of bifurcated capitalism in the period before and after China's accession to the World Trade Organization.

In recent years, China and India have extensively liberalized their economies. They have departed from the East Asian developmental states, which have restricted foreign direct investment (FDI) to protect domestic industry, and the liberal FDI strategy of Latin America during a similar stage of development as they have eschewed dependent development. Instead, they have taken a "liberalization two-step," which follows liberalization with reregulation that varies across industrial sectors. Country and sectoral case studies demonstrate the perceived strategic value of a sector, sectoral characteristics, and the organization of state institutions shape the ways in which reregulation varies. Insulated from political pressures, the Chinese state shifts from universal controls on the aggregate level to selective controls at the sectoral level and adopts a bifurcated strategy in its reregulation. In India, the government liberalizes FDI according to state goals but reregulates as a function of sectoral interests arising from the legacy of its postindependence economic strategy. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]